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he Sveriges Riksbank, the Swedish central bank, is an authority
under the Riksdag (parliament) with responsibility for monetary
policy. Its objectives are to maintain price stability and to promote a
safe and efficient payment system. With the advent of the new regime,
which went into effect in January 1999, the Riksdag appoints the
Riksbank’s Governing Council, which, in turn, appoints its Executive
Board, including its Chairman, who serves as Governor of the Riksbank.
Amember of the Executive Board may not be a member of the Riksdag, a
government minister, or an employee of the Government Office. Further,
Executive Board members may not take or seek instructions with regard
to monetary policy. Thus, the Executive Board has instrument, but not
goal, independence.
Central Bank Assets
In the week of June 15, 2000, the Riksbank held assets of 219 billion
kronor, of which 64 percent were foreign currency claims on residents
outside of Sweden. These claims were mainly balances with banks and
investments in securities. Gold accounted for an additional 7 percent.
Lending to monetary policy counterparties denominated in Swedish
kronor made up another 16 percent of the Riksbank’s total assets. Main
refinancing operations, or regular repo transactions, accounted for the52 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
great bulk of this entry. Assets related to fine-tuning
operationswereaverysmallfractionoftotalassets.The
final components of Riksbank assets were securities
denominated in kronor and issued by Swedish resi-
dents (11 percent, entirely government debt) and “other
assets” (1 percent).
Objectives
Between 1977 and 1992, Sweden directed its mon-
etary policy toward maintaining a unilateral exchange
rate target, pegging the krona in terms of a currency
basket and, later, the ecu.1 In the currency turmoil of
late 1992, however, Sweden abandoned its fixed
exchange rate and adopted an explicit inflation target
with no other intermediate objective. Policymakers
believed that the central bank’s inflation forecast actu-
ally serves as a good intermediate target and provides
for efficient monitoring by the public. The Riksbank
chose a 12-month inflation target of 2 percent with a
tolerance band of plus or minus 1 percent, to become
effective in 1995, once the impact of the krona’s sharp
1992 depreciation had been absorbed. The target
applies to headline CPI inflation, but the authorities
have indicated that if the impacts of changes in mort-
gage rates, taxes, or subsidies, or of large external
shocks, are deemed to be transitory, they are likely to
be accommodated. If so, the expected deviation from
target must be explained in advance.2
Operating Procedures
The Riksbank influences the demand for money
by adjusting short-term interest rates. Its ability to
influence interest rates in the overnight market stems
from its right to determine the terms under which it
accepts deposits from and lends to banks participating
in the central payments system. The policy framework
encourages, but does not require, banks to achieve a
zero balance in their kronor accounts with the pay-
ments system at the end of the day. The overnight rate,
in turn, affects price developments in the economy via
many different channels.
Standing Facilities
The Riksbank’s Executive Board sets the repo
rate—and, thus, the overnight deposit and lending
rates—to steer monetary conditions. Since mid-1994,
the Riksbank has made its overnight deposit and
lending facilities available at a single unified interest
rate for each facility.3 These rates are set, respective-
ly, 75 basis points below and above the repo rate and
are currently 3.5 percent and 5.0 percent. A bank
needing liquidity can use the lending facility with-
out limit as long as it can present eligible assets as
collateral. However, the gap between the interest
rates for the lending facility and the deposit facility
is sufficiently large that banks have an incentive to
eliminate any deficit or surplus in their payments
position in the overnight market. Moreover, the
Riksbank has indicated that it will normally supply
enough liquidity that the banks will not need to use
its facilities.
Open Market Operations via 
Repurchase Agreements
The Executive Board sets the repo rate by buying
securities under repurchase agreements with a one-
week maturity (when a liquidity deficit exists) or issu-
ing debt certificates (when there is a liquidity sur-
plus).4 The fixed repo rate, announced weekly, is the
Riksbank’s target for the overnight rate in the inter-
bank market and serves as its primary operating objec-
tive and signaling device. (The Riksbank has also used
variable-rate tenders on rare occasions.) Currently and
for the foreseeable future, the Riksbank plans to con-
duct all open market operations via repos rather than
via outright purchases. The primary dealers, a group
currently composed of seven banks, are the counter-
parties in the Riksbank’s weekly auctions.
Because reserve requirements were set to zero in
1994 and because the demand for bank notes is not
very sensitive to changes in interest rates over the
short run, any unexpected shift in the demand for
1 In August 1977 Sweden left the prevailing European
exchange rate system and unilaterally pegged the krona in terms of a
currency basket, a trade-weighted exchange rate index in which the
U.S. dollar had a double weight because of its role as a transactions
currency. In May 1991 the basket was unilaterally redefined to equal
the ecu in preparation for closer ties to the European Union.  
2 Recently, policy has been based on assessments of UND1X
and UND1NHX inflation, which exclude the impact of interest pay-
ments and the direct effects of changes in indirect taxes and subsi-
dies, and in the case of the UND1NHX, the impact of import prices. 
3 Under the previous system, the banks’ marginal cost of bor-
rowing increased with the amount borrowed. The new system
allows the Riksbank to send clearer signals about its intentions.
4 When the banking system faces a liquidity deficit, the
Riksbank supplies money by buying securities through weekly
repos. When the system is in surplus, the Riksbank withdraws liq-
uidity by issuing Riksbank certificates. On occasion, the Riksbank
also engages in foreign exchange swaps.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 53
reserves quickly pushes the banks into the lending or
the borrowing facility. As their marginal cost of funds
changes, so too does the interbank rate. Thus, the
Riksbank intervenes in the interbank market (at a rate
equal to the weekly repo rate plus or minus 10 basis
points) to fine-tune the overnight rate. Because a few
large banks dominate the interbank market, it is rela-
tively easy to monitor the banks’ liquidity positions on
a continuous basis.
Assets Used for Repo Operations
As required by law, the assets used in open mar-
ket operations are Swedish Treasury paper and other
“readily marketable” securities. Currently, these secu-
rities must be booked by the Swedish Register Centre
(VPC) and included in its clearing system. Thus, the
issuer must be Swedish, and the set of acceptable
assets is narrower than the set accepted as collateral
for Riksbank overnight credit and the Rix system, as
described below.5 In late 1999, however, the Riksbank’s
Executive Board amended its policy on collateral in
part to bring the set of eligible assets more in line with
those used for other Riksbank operations. The new
standards put more emphasis on external credit rat-
ings and have so far only been implemented for intra-
day and overnight credit.6 The securities used for
repos are marked to their market value, including the
value of accrued interest, and an initial safety margin
of 4 percent of the amount paid out is deducted.
The Rix Payments System
The electronic Rix system is the hub of the
Swedish payments system. All transactions in Swedish
kronor are settled through Rix. In late 1999, 24 institu-
tions participated: all 19 banks, the Bankgiro Centre,
the Securities Register Centre, OM Stockholm AB, the
National Debt Office, and the Riksbank itself. The par-
ticipants must meet capital, risk management, and
technical qualifications and have access to SWIFT or a
similar electronic payment information system. Rix is
a real-time gross settlement system, although some
types of payments are bundled or netted. It has a daily
turnover of about SKr 300 billion (equivalent to about
20 percent of Sweden’s GNP).
Although Sweden has not joined the European
Monetary Union, it is a part of the European Union.
Thus, the Riksbank is a member of TARGET, the Trans-
European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer System, the common payments sys-
tem that went into effect on January 1, 1999. Since only
national central banks and the European Central Bank
(ECB) are members of TARGET, the Swedish commer-
cial banks are linked to TARGET through the
Riksbank’s E-Rix system (for euros). The banks can
choose to have an account with the Riksbank in kro-
nor, in euros, or both. 
Rix Risk Management
The Rix risk management system requires that
payments be placed in a queue if the payor institution
does not have an adequate positive balance or credit
available in its Rix account. To facilitate the efficiency
of the system, the Riksbank supplies intraday credit.
For kronor transactions (K-Rix), it can provide intra-
day credit against acceptable collateral7 up to the mar-
ket value8 of the collateral offered less a margin or
haircut.9 Although the policy framework encourages
participants to achieve zero balances in their K-Rix
accounts by the end of the day, they may carry positive
or negative balances in these accounts overnight.10 By
contrast, in the case of euro transactions, the ECB sets a
ceiling of 1 billion euros on the amount of intraday
credit that the Riksbank can provide (against collateral
approved by the ECB). It also requires that partici-
pants must settle euro credits by the close of the day.
The Riksbank cannot provide intraday credit in euros
after 5 p.m.11
5 In addition to central government Treasury bills and bonds,
the current list includes bonds and certificates issued by eight other
institutions including the National Swedish Housing Finance Corp.,
Nordbanken Hypotek, AB Spintab, and SEB BoLan AB. In other
words, the set includes debt issued by large private financial institu-
tions without a government guarantee.
6 In the new system, the external credit rating must be at least
single A. Banks will not be accepted as eligible issuers, but the secu-
rities of other private firms from Sweden or other highly rated
OECD countries will be accepted if they meet the required credit rat-
ing. Practical considerations about location eliminate some foreign
collateral, but collateral held in Euroclear will be acceptable. While
these securities became acceptable as collateral for intraday and
overnight credit in late 1999, some administrative problems and
legal aspects have delayed the implementation of the new policy
with regard to repo operations.
7 Except in the case of the state, which does not need to provide
collateral. This provision is the only exception to the proscription
against Riksbank lending directly to the state. 
8 The Riksbank conducts market valuation on a daily basis.
9 The market value of a security is adjusted for residual maturi-
ty and foreign exchange risk. No deduction is made if the residual
maturity is less than 1 year. The margin is 1.5 percent for maturities of
1 to less than 3 years, 2 percent for maturities of 3 to less than 7 years,
3 percent for coupon instruments over 7 years, and 5 percent for zero-
coupon bonds of over 7 years. Foreign exchange risk requires a hair-
cut of 3 percent. In addition, a 1 percent initial margin applies to all
credits. The initial margin is an addition to the utilized credit.
10 Government agencies cannot receive overnight credit. 54 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
Collateral
The Riksbank provides continuously updated
lists of securities that are accepted and used as collat-
eral.12 For kronor credit, the Riksbank accepts Swedish
or foreign debt instruments issued by a government,
central bank, local government or other public body,
or a company that is not a bank (but settlement banks
and the like are not excluded).13 However, the issuer
must be a country or domiciled in one of the countries
that have been approved by the Riksbank. The
Riksbank also accepts foreign currency. These assets
must be listed at a Swedish or foreign security
exchange or be regularly traded at another regulated
market or be deemed otherwise sufficiently liquid.
They must also be registered at a central securities
depository or be subject to other adequately secure
arrangements for pledging and transfer. 
Fiscal Issues
In June 1999, Sweden’s total stock of government
securities and paper issued by mortgage institutions
equaled about SKr 1,700 billion. (These two assets rep-
resent the great bulk of all securities issued in kronor.)
At that time, the banks held SKr 200 billion in securi-
ties approved as collateral, of which only SKr 50 bil-
lion were actually being used as collateral for loans
from the Riksbank. Because the supply of collateral
seemed ample (and banks are entitled to borrow as
much as they need as long as they can offer collateral),
the Riksbank saw no need to establish a special bor-
rowing facility for the century date change. 
Sweden achieved a public sector financial surplus
in 1998 for the first time since 1990, and ongoing sur-
pluses are expected. Indeed, the government and
Parliament have set a public sector surplus averaging
2 percent of GDP over the business cycle as a central
target for budget policy. In 2000, the general govern-
ment surplus amounted to just over 4 percent of nomi-
nal GDP, in part reflecting the partial privatization of
Telia, the Swedish telecom system. The OECD projects
a surplus of 3.6 percent of GDP for 2001. 
Sweden also started to repay government debt in
1998 and plans to continue to do so. Gross debt has
fallen from over 70 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s to
a projected 56 percent in 2001.14 The OECD anticipates
that general government net financial liabilities will
fall from 23 percent of GDP in 1995 to 4 percent in
2001. The unusually big gap between the govern-
ment’s gross and net liabilities largely reflects the
accumulation of pension reserves. 
As the Swedish National Debt Office has dis-
cussed, the government’s fiscal policy implies an
increased scarcity value for government bonds and
will affect the government’s borrowing strategy. In
2000 the Debt Office offset the impact of the Telia 
sale through a combination of reduced issuance of
Treasury bills and the repurchase of less liquid bonds,
in order to meet its duration target and maintain sup-
plies of debt issues that are attractive to investors. It
also intends to amortize SKr 25 billion in foreign cur-
rency debt, in part to support issue volumes in the
domestic market.15 In addition, refinancing of foreign
debt will occur by borrowing in kronor and swapping
the proceeds into foreign currency, instead of borrow-
ing foreign currency directly. The motives again
include the reduction of borrowing costs and the
maintenance of kronor issues. Over the longer term,
the Debt Office plans to focus debt issuance on market
benchmarks. It also intends to encourage electronic
trading, since more efficient trading arrangements
improve liquidity. 
Recently, moreover, pension reform has widened
the investment options for the accumulated pension
funds, which equal about 25 percent of Swedish GDP,
to include equities and foreign assets. Previously, these
funds were largely invested in Swedish government
securities. Now, up to 40 percent of these assets may be
subject to foreign exchange risk, while exposure to
companies listed on the Stockholm exchange is allow-
able up to a ceiling of 8 percent.
11 If a euro credit is not settled by the close of business, the
interest payable equals the European System of Central Banks’ mar-
ginal lending rate plus 5 percentage points plus an additional penal-
ty that rises with each subsequent failure to settle. Repeated infrac-
tions will lead to suspension or denial of access. 
12 For euro credit, the Riksbank only accepts assets approved
by the ECB. 
13 Except for mortgage securities issued by the borrowing
bank’s subsidiary.
14 The central government debt represents the bulk of public
sector debt. The central government’s debt in kronor and foreign
currencies fell from 81 percent of GDP in 1995 to just under 70 per-
cent in 1999. 
15 About 30 percent of the Swedish government’s outstanding
debt is denominated in foreign currencies. Because it believes that a
broad investor base contributes to lower borrowing costs, it has
sought to attract foreign investors, and 30 percent of its kronor debt
is owned by foreigners.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 55
References
Bank for International Settlements. 1997. Monetary Policy in the
Nordic Countries: Experience since 1992. Policy Paper 2. Basle: Bank
for International Settlements (October).
____________. 1999. “Implications of Repo Markets for Central
Banks: Report of a Working Group Established by the Committee
on the Global Financial System of the Central Banks of the Group
of Ten Countries” (March 9).
Franzén, Thomas. 2000a. “Sweden Amortises Central Government
Debt—Long-Term Market Efficiency Important.” Comments 
by the Swedish National Debt Office Director-General
<http://www.sndo.se/scripts/wsisa.dll/rgk/pub/showDoc?Do
cID=516> (9 March).
____________. 2000b. “Budget Surplus and Borrowing Strategy.”
Speech by the Swedish National Debt Office Director-General pre-
sented at the Central Bank Seminar in Berlin (11 April).
Heikensten, Lars. 1999. “The Riksbank’s Inflation Target—
Clarification and evaluation.” Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Review 1:
pp. 5–17.
Hessius, Kerstin. 1999. “The Role of Central Bank and Market
Liquidity.” Speech by Sveriges Riksbank Deputy Governor pre-
sented at the seminar with Sveriges Finansanalytikers Förening,
<http://www.riksbank.com/RB_Components/Speech/Speech.A
SP?ItemID=3356> (14 September).
Mitlid, Kerstin and Magnus Vesterlund. 2001. “Steering Interest
Rates in Monetary Policy—How Does It Work?” Sveriges Riksbank
Quarterly Review 1: pp. 19–41.
Mylonas, Paul, Sebastian Schich, Thorsteinn Thorgeirsson and Gert
Wehinger. 2000. “New Issues in Public Debt Management,” OECD
Economics Department Working Papers No. 239 (April).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1999.
OECD Economic Outlook (December).
Sveriges Riksbank. 1999. Rules and Regulations for Settlement of
Payments in RIX. Stockholm: Sveriges Riksbank.
____________. “The Riksbank’s Year 2000 Preparations.” 6 October
1999, Riksbank Press Release. <http://www.riksbank.com/RB_
Components/News/News.ASP?ItemID=3425> (24 May 2000).
____________. Inflation Report 2000:1. Stockholm: Sveriges Riksbank
(March 2000).
____________. The Riksbank Functions. <http://www.riksbank.com>
(24 May 2000).
____________. 2000. Weekly Report, 2000-06-15. < http://www.
riksbank.com/upload/4146/VE000615.xls> (30 June 2000).
____________. “Eligible Securities for Monetary Policy Repos.”
<http://www.riksbank.com/SinglePage/SinglePage.asp?ItemID
=3995> (3 July 2000).
Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish Parliament). 2000. The Sveriges Riksbank
Act (1988:1385). As from 1 January 2000.
Swedish National Debt Office (SNDO). 2000. “The Swedish National
Debt Office Anticipates a Budget Surplus of SEK 98 Billion 
in June.” 9 May, SNDO Press Release. <http://www.sndo.se/
pressenglish.htm> (26 May 2000).
____________. 2000. Annual Report 1999. Stockholm: SNDO.
____________.  Historical Facts—Government Debt. <http:/ /www.
sndo.se/scripts/wsisa.dll/rgk/pub/showDoc?DocId=358> (26
June 2000).
____________. Liquidity Management. <http://www.sndo.se/scripts/
wsisa.dll/rgk/pub/showDoc?DocId=269> (24 May 2000).
The Riksbank sees maintaining the liquidity of the
government debt market as desirable because that
market is an important part of the transmission mech-
anism for monetary policy. Further, an illiquid govern-
ment bond market would distort the government yield
curve, which the Riksbank uses to extract information
about market expectations regarding future monetary
policy.